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In This Corner:  An Analysis of Federal Boxing Legislation 
Brad Ehrlichman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Muhammad Ali—arguably the greatest boxer of all time—lay beaten in a 
hospital bed.  Defeated by his former sparring partner, Larry Holmes, Ali was 
battered and prone:  King Arthur run through by Mordred.1  An aide to Don King, 
Ali’s long-time promoter, stole into the room with a briefcase.  At the time, King 
owed Ali over $1 million.2  Inside the briefcase was $50,000 in cash, which Ali—
defeated—accepted after signing a release dropping all claims against King.3  
While the Senate’s version of what was to ultimately become the Muhammad Ali 
Boxing Reform Act (“Ali Act”), referenced only Ali’s “unsurpassed” “career 
achievements and personal contributions to the sport [of boxing],” it is likely that 
this shameful episode was present in legislators’ minds when honoring their bill’s 
revered—yet tragic—eponym.4 
Passed in 2000, the Ali Act was Congress’s second foray into the arena of 
boxing legislation, following the Professional Boxers Safety Act (“PBSA”) of 
1996.5  While the PBSA was aimed at protecting boxers within the ring, the Ali Act 
was intended “to protect the rights and welfare of professional boxers . . . by 
preventing certain exploitative, oppressive, and unethical business practices” 
outside the ring.6  Indeed, tales of corruption are as much a part of the folklore of 
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 1. According to legend, King Arthur was killed by his illegitimate son, Mordred to whom he 
also dealt a fatal blow.  See The Death of Arthur and Mordred, U. FLA., http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/ 
jshoaf/Arthmort.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010).   Unlike King Arthur, however, Ali was unable to inflict 
much damage on his opponent, landing only ten blows before being unable to meet the bell for the 
eleventh round.  See Michael Katz, Holmes Stops Ali and Keeps Heavyweight Title, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 
1980, http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/10/25/specials/ali-holmesstops.html. 
 2. JACK NEWFIELD, ONLY IN AMERICA:  THE LIFE AND CRIMES OF DON KING 233 (1995) 
(detailing how King allegedly owed Ali $1.1 million under a bout agreement). 
 3. LARRY ELDER, THE TEN THINGS YOU CAN’T SAY IN AMERICA 92 (2000). 
 4. S. 305, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999). 
 5. Professional Boxers Safety Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-272, 110 Stat. 3314 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301–13 (2006)). 
 6. Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006). 
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boxing as legends of great fights, indomitable champions and intrepid underdogs.  
Thus, for every retelling of Marvin Hagler’s brutal three-round tilt with Thomas 
Hearns, there is an account of the indictment of former International Boxing 
Federation president Robert Lee for allegedly extorting $338,000 in payoffs to 
manipulate rankings.7  For every awed recollection of Joe Louis’s unprecedented 
twenty-five consecutive heavyweight title defenses, there is the story of former 
heavyweight champion Tim Witherspoon being forced to sign four contracts while 
being promoted by Don King:  one made King his exclusive promoter; another 
made King’s son, Carl, Witherspoon’s manager, entitled to thirty-three percent of 
his earnings; the third was a duplicate of Carl King’s managerial contract, only this 
one entitled him to fifty percent of Witherspoon’s earnings; and the last was 
completely blank, allowing King to write in any terms he wished.8  And, for every 
narration of Buster Douglas’s knockout victory of the seemingly invincible Mike 
Tyson in Tokyo, there is the embarrassing anecdote about Darrin Morris—a super-
middleweight boxer who died in October of 2000, only to climb the World Boxing 
Organization (“WBO”) rankings until he was able to attain in death what eluded 
him in life:  a top-five ranking.9 
It was against this backdrop of “corruption, manipulation, and scandal” that the 
Ali Act was passed.10  Part I of this Article will discuss the three main concerns of 
the Act:  1) coercive or unethical contracts; 2) manipulated rankings; and 3) 
piecemeal state regulation that allows promoters to “take advantage of the lack of 
equitable business standards in the sport by holding boxing events in States with 
weaker regulatory oversight.”11  The relative success or failure of the Ali Act in 
addressing these three interests will be evaluated in turn.  Part II then addresses the 
three primary reasons why the Ali Act lacks punch:  1) its absence of enforcement; 
2) the inadequate protection it offers the boxers most in need of safeguarding; and 
3) its anonymity among those for whom it was enacted.  Finally, Part III examines 
further measures that may help remedy the shortcomings identified in Part II, 
focusing on the establishment of a United States Boxing Commission, as proposed 
 
 7. Jack Newfield, The Shame of Boxing, THE NATION, Nov. 12, 2001, at 13.  For an account of 
Hagler-Hearns, see Adeyinka Makinde, Retreading Hagler Versus Hearns, E. SIDE BOXING, 
http://www.eastsideboxing.com/HaglervsHearns.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).  The International 
Boxing Federation (“IBF”), along with the World Boxing Council (“WBC”) and the World Boxing 
Federation (“WBA”), is one of the three major bodies that sanction championship bouts and promulgate 
rankings of fighters.  See Michael J. Jurek, Janitor or Savior:  The Role of Congress in Professional 
Boxing Reform, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1187, 1196 (2006). 
 8. NEWFIELD, supra note 2, at 224; see List of Joe Louis’ Fights, BOXREC, http://boxrec.com/ 
list_bouts.php?human_id=9027&cat=boxer (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 9. Devin J. Burstein, Note, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act:  Its Problems and Remedies, 
Including the Possibility of a United States Boxing Administration, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 433, 
459–60 (2003); Douglas v. Tyson, Round by Round, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1990, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/12/sports/douglas-vs-tyson-round-by-round.html?pagewanted=1. 
 10. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1187. 
 11. H.R. REP. NO. 106-449, pt. 1, at 2 (1999); Thomas Hauser, No One is Enforcing the Federal 
Boxing Laws, ESPN.COM (Sept. 25, 2007), http://sports.espn.go.com/sports/boxing/news/story? 
id=3032059. 
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by the Professional Boxing Amendments Act.12 
 
I.  THE ALI ACT SHUFFLE:  FIGHTING COERCIVE CONTRACTS, 
MANIPULATED RANKINGS AND DISUNIFORM STATE REGULATION 
The Ali Act addresses coercive or unethical contracts, ranking manipulations 
and the deleterious effect of the current patchwork system of disuniform state 
regulation.  It will prove helpful to provide a cursory discussion of the major 
players falling under the Act’s ambit before discussing its substantive provisions.  
There are over 8,500 licensed professional boxers in the United States.13  “Boxers 
are often poor, uneducated, and inexperienced in business”; nearly ninety-nine 
percent of boxers come from impoverished backgrounds.14  Thus, boxers obtain 
representation from managers who handle boxers’ business dealings, usually in 
exchange for one-third of the boxer’s purse.15  Though managers are often 
considered to be more foe than friend—perhaps due to the large fees they claim—
they nonetheless owe a fiduciary duty to their boxers.16 
Promoters owe no such fiduciary duty to their boxers.17  In fact, “the boxer’s 
financial interests are in direct conflict with those of the promoter” because the 
promoter “keeps the difference between the total revenues and total expenses for 
the promotion of a bout.”18  The fighters’ purses represent the greatest expenses in 
promoting a bout.19  Thus, in order to maximize profit, a promoter must minimize 
the purse paid to a fight’s participants.20  This “conflict of interest” underscores the 
importance of a manager negotiating with a promoter vigorously and impartially to 
further his boxer’s best interest.21 
 
 12. S. 38, 111th Cong. § 202 (2009). 
 13. Melissa Neiman, Protecting Professional Boxers:  Federal Regulations with More Punch, 15 
SPORTS LAW. J. 59, 64 (2008). 
 14. JOYCE CAROL OATES, ON BOXING 85 (1987); Burstein, supra note 9, at 439; see also 
THOMAS HAUSER, THE BLACK LIGHTS 9 (1986) (“Most fighters come from tough places; small 
beginnings where life is hard.”). 
 15. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1193. 
 16. Damon Moore, Down for the Count:  Is McCain’s Bill the One to Lift Boxing off the Canvas?, 
4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 198, 201–02 (2005); see also Jim Thomas, How Fighters Can Protect 
Themselves Outside the Ring:  Part One, SECONDSOUT.COM, http://www.secondsout.com/ringside/the-
business-of-boxing/how-fighters-can-protect-themselves-outside-the-ring-part-one (last visited Feb. 2, 
2011) (comparing the manager-fighter relationship and the attorney-client relationship, wherein both 
managers and attorneys are obligated to pursue their clients’ best interests and avoid conflicts of 
interest). 
 17. Symposium, Boxing at the Crossroads, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 193, 237 (2001) 
(statements of Lou DiBella and Patrick English) (noting that, under case law, a promoter does not owe a 
fiduciary duty to a boxer). 
 18. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1195. 
 19. Moore, supra note 16, at 204. 
 20. Scott Baglio, Note, The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act:  The First Jab at Establishing 
Credibility in Professional Boxing, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2262 (“[T]he less money a boxer 
accepts for a particular bout, the more profits are available for the promoter.”). 
 21. Id. 
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Sanctioning bodies “control two very important aspects of boxing:  sanctioning 
championship bouts and promulgating rankings of fighters.”22  Without official 
sanction, “a fight cannot be recognized as a ‘championship bout,’ and thus is less 
attractive to both television and the viewing public.”23  Sanctioning bodies typically 
charge three percent of each fighter’s purse in exchange for sanctioning a 
championship fight.24  The rankings promulgated by sanctioning bodies are vital to 
a boxer’s career, because they determine which fighters can fight for their 
respective division’s championship.25  Though every sanctioning body has different 
rules, a “fighter generally must be ranked in the top fifteen of a sanctioning 
organization’s weight division” in order to get a title shot.26 
Furthermore, only the number one contender in each weight class is ever 
guaranteed the opportunity to fight for his division’s championship.27  In fact, 
rankings are so fundamental to a boxer that one court held that a third-ranked junior 
middleweight contender had a protectable property interest in his ranking.28  While 
every sanctioning body purports to rank fighters based on a set of subjective and 
objective criteria, the formulation and application of these criteria did not prevent a 
deceased fighter from twice moving up in a sanctioning body’s rankings in the year 
following his death.29  Scandals such as Damien Moore’s blossoming posthumous 
career and the indictment of the former IBF president for receiving bribes to alter 
rankings allowed Senator McCain to uncontroversially state that “[i]t is a fact that 
the ratings system in professional boxing has less credibility among athletes and 
their fans than any other ratings system in professional sports.”30  Unsurprisingly, 
then, “many credit sanctioning organizations . . . [as] the root of boxing’s evils.”31 
Ever since boxing was first regulated by New York in 1896, state boxing 
commissions have been the “only party that has the legal and legislative authority 
 
 22. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1196. 
 23. Baglio, supra note 20, at 2263. 
 24. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1196. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Duva v. World Boxing Ass’n, 548 F. Supp. 710, 718–20 (D.N.J. 1982). 
 29. Tim Graham, New WBO Division:  Dead Weight, ESPN.COM (Feb. 20, 2001), 
http://assets.espn.go.com/boxing/columns/graham/1097210.html; see, e.g., IBF Ratings Criteria, IBF-
USBA BOXINC, http://www.ibf-usba-boxing.com/index.php?pg=12 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (showing 
that IBF ratings criteria include win/loss records, level of competition, activity and a boxer’s adherence 
to IBF/USBA rules and regulations). 
 30. IBF Indictments Surprise Few, CBS NEWS.COM, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1999/ 
07/26/sports/main55863.shtml?tag=mncol;lst;3 (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (“In the IBF, rankings were 
bought, not earned.  The defendants completely corrupted the IBF ranking system.”). 
 31. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1197; see also Symposium, supra note 17, at 200 (statement of Mills 
Lane); id. at 209 (statement of Amos C. Saunders) (“The major problem as I see it is the problem raised 
by both Mills Lane and Jerry Izenberg and that is the sanctioning organizations.  Quite frankly they have 
to go.  They are not honest.  They are not fair.  They are not moral.”); id. at 222 (statement of Kathy 
Duva) (“[E]verybody here [at the symposium] has just about said that the sanctioning organizations are 
the problem.”); id. at 231 (statement of Lou DiBella) (“You got to get rid of the ratings organization, 
which in my humble opinion are organized crime, are racketeering ventures and criminal 
conspiracies.”). 
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to regulate a boxing event.”32  As such, state boxing commissions are “charged 
with establishing and enforcing regulations in order to protect the health and safety 
of fighters.”33  As Senator McCain has pointed out, despite their primary 
importance in the existing scheme of boxing regulation, state “boxing commissions 
are used by governors as a place to give political awards.  A large number of 
boxing commissioners wouldn’t know a boxing glove from a catcher’s mitt.”34  
Unfortunately, Senator McCain’s statement is more fact than hyperbole.35  Besides 
being “monuments to political patronage and soft money,” state boxing 
commissions “have been underfunded [and] undermanned.”36  Undeniably, the 
“inadequate and improper staffing of state [boxing] commissions . . . allows . . . 
corruption by promoters and sanctioning organizations to go unchecked.”37 
Furthermore, in the absence of a federal boxing commission, “each state is free 
to promulgate its own regulations regardless of the requirements of other states.”38  
This creates a race to the bottom in which each state is incentivized to set forth the 
most lax regulations possible in order to attract promoters and bouts.  For example, 
several states—including Nevada, Texas, Colorado, West Virginia and Georgia—
refused to grant Mike Tyson a license to fight Lennox Lewis in a June 8, 2002 bout 
“due to his violent and criminal activity outside the ring and his violent and 
unsportsmanlike conduct inside the ring.”39  However, Tennessee eventually agreed 
to license Tyson, and the fight occurred in Memphis, grossing over $100 million, 
including gross gate revenue of $17.5 million.40  While forty-six state commissions 
 
 32. Patrick B. Fife, Note, The National Boxing Commission Act of 2001:  It’s Time for Congress 
to Step Into the Ring and Save the Sport of Boxing, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1299, 1305 (2002) (citing 
Hearings on Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 
105th Cong. 43 (1998) [hereinafter Ali Act Hearings] (statement of Gregory P. Sirb, then President, 
Ass’n of Boxing Comm’n)); see Senator John McCain & Ken Nahigian, A Fighting Chance for 
Professional Boxing, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 7, 10 (2004) (noting that “[i]n the United States, 
professional boxing or ‘prize-fighting’ was first legalized in California and Louisiana, [but] first 
regulated by New York in 1896.”). 
 33. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1198. 
 34. See Justin Brown, Down for the Count?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 24, 2001, at 13 
(quoting Sen. John McCain); see also J. Bradley Clair, Why Federal Preemption Is Necessary to Create 
Uniform Professional Boxer Safety Standards, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1173, 1200 (2008) (“[M]ost [state 
boxing] commissioners are selected based on political affiliations as opposed to qualifications.”); id. at 
1199 (explaining how Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn appointed T.J. Day, “a man with no experience in 
the boxing industry,” because he was a “large contributor to the Nevada Republican Party”). 
 35. For example, Nancy Black, the executive director of the Kentucky Athletic Commission, the 
agency overseeing boxing regulation in that commonwealth, stated “[o]n boxing itself, I can’t say that 
I’m an expert.”  See Deborah Hastings, Page Should’ve Closed the Book, TIMES UNION (ALBANY), Apr. 
15, 2001, at E8 (quoting Nancy Black).  Ms. Black had never even attended a boxing match until two 
weeks after former heavyweight champion Greg Page, then forty-two, sustained serious brain damage 
during a match held in Kentucky.  See Fife, supra note 32, at 1306. 
 36. Symposium, supra note 17, at 214 (statement of Lou DiBella). 
 37. Fife, supra note 32, at 1307. 
 38. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1198. 
 39. Fife, supra note 32, at 1305. 
 40. See Trinidad Retires?;  Barrera-Morales & Lewis-Tyson PPV Numbers, ABOUT.COM (July 7, 
2002),  http://boxing.about.com/library/weekly/aa070702.htm (noting that both figures set industry 
records); see also McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 28 (stating that because of the “limitations of 
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are “loosely affiliated under the Association of Boxing Commissions” (“ABC”), 
the ABC is “merely a non-profit group with no regulatory power over state boxing 
commissions.”41  The ABC’s impotence was on display in the Tyson licensing 
debacle, when Tennessee, an ABC member, ignored the Commission’s request by 
licensing the former undisputed heavyweight champion. 
Having clarified the roles of boxing’s background players—their relative 
advantages and disadvantages, motivations and means—the need for Congress to 
pass the Ali Act, and its purpose in doing so, should now be evident.  Boxers, as 
vulnerable outside the ring as they are inside it, must negotiate against better 
educated, savvier, more experienced promoters who wield the assets accruing to 
“repeat players.”42  As a result, boxers are “‘continu[ously] exploited in their 
contractual agreements with managers and promoters.”43  State boxing 
commissions are populated by individuals content in their sinecures, unable or 
unwilling to provide adequate protection to boxers.44  Moreover, sanctioning bodies 
flout their own ratings criteria, with the result that undeserving but well connected 
fighters are given title fights, the public is subjected to “lower-quality bouts” 
involving boxers “undeserving” of their high rankings and overmatched fighters 
face potentially fatal consequences.45 
Against this backdrop, Congress passed the Ali Act.46  As stated, the three 
primary purposes of the Ali Act are:  1) eliminating coercive or unethical contracts; 
2) eradicating rankings manipulation through the imposition of published and 
rational criteria; and 3) circumventing the “forum shopping” that arises out of the 
current, piecemeal system of state regulation and the resulting race to the bottom 
among state boxing commissions in promulgating regulations and licensing 
requirements.47  The means of achieving these three purposes, and the Ali Act’s 
success in doing so, will now be examined in turn. 
 
state regulation in the interstate activity” of boxing, “Tyson was free to forum shop among state and 
tribal commissions for another venue to host the fight”); id. at 27 (“Because of the nearly $200 million 
that was expected to be generated by the bout, many state commissions lined up to host the fight, eager 
to capitalize on what could have been significant revenue for their local economies.”). 
 41. Burstein, supra note 9, at 445; Jurek, supra note 7, at 1198. 
 42. For a discussion about the various and distinct advantages gained by “repeat players” in a 
system over “one-shot” players, see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:  Speculations 
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
 43. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1207 (citing McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 20). 
 44. Given that Senator Harry Reid of Nevada has stated that “his two most important 
constituents” are Don King and Bob Arum, boxing’s two biggest promoters, it does not seem far fetched 
that appointees to state boxing commissions would be solicitous of promoters’ wishes over those of 
boxers.  See Fife, supra note 32, at 1310 n.88 (citing Baglio, supra note 20, at 2281). 
 45. See Baglio, supra note 20, at 2276–78 (discussing how Francois Botha, a heavyweight boxer 
promoted by Don King, was rated the IBF’s number one contender, “despite having never beaten a top-
10 contender”); see also Burstein, supra note 9, at 444 (discussing bout between lightweight champion 
Ray “Boom-Boom” Mancini and Duk Koo Kim of South Korea, in which Kim was knocked 
unconscious and later died; at the time, Kim was the WBA’s number one contender, despite not even 
being ranked among Korea’s top forty fighters). 
 46. Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 106-210, 114 Stat. 321 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301–13 (2006)). 
 47. See McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 27. 
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A.  COERCIVE OR UNETHICAL CONTRACTS 
The Ali Act attempts to stamp out coercive or unethical contracts through four 
provisions that:  1) require the ABC to “develop and . . . approve . . . guidelines for 
minimal contractual provisions that should be included in bout agreements and 
boxing contracts” within two years after the date of the Ali Act’s enactment; 2) 
provide that any coercive contract provision “shall be considered to be in restraint 
of trade, contrary to public policy, and unenforceable against any boxer”; 3) 
mandate that a promoter make various disclosures to the relevant state boxing 
commission regarding applicable contracts with any boxers involved in the match, 
as well as disclose to the boxer “the amounts of any compensation or consideration 
that a promoter has contracted to receive from [the] match”; and 4) establish a 
“firewall between promoters and managers” under which “[i]t is unlawful for a 
promoter to have a direct or indirect financial interest in the management of a boxer 
or . . . a manager . . . to be employed by or receive compensation or other benefits 
from a promoter.”48 
1.  Minimal Contractual Guidelines 
The Ali Act grants the ABC two years to “develop and . . . approve by a vote of 
no less than a majority of its member State boxing commissioners, guidelines for 
minimum contractual provisions that should be included in bout agreements and 
boxing contracts.”49  While well intentioned, it is unclear whether this provision 
will provide boxers with any tangible protection or benefit.  First, the ABC is 
comprised of forty-six states, many of which either do not sanction many boxing 
matches, or do so under the barest of regulations and licensing requirements.50  
Thus, having a majority of the member states of the ABC promulgate minimum 
contractual provisions may actually result in boxers encountering more onerous 
contract terms than they otherwise would have when fighting in states that are more 
solicitous of their welfare. 
Second, issuing minimum contractual provisions may preclude opportunities for 
lesser known or more lightly regarded fighters to get their “shot.”  A confident 
boxer may actually choose to sign a contract with provisions that fall below the 
floor set by the ABC, in order to prove his worth under the initial contract and 
thereafter secure a more favorable one.  Further, whatever minimum contractual 
provisions are developed by the ABC, they are only valuable to the boxer who is 
aware of their existence.  Any law or entitlement is only effective to the extent that 
it is known and invoked by its intended beneficiaries.  Given the relative lack of 
 
 48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6307–08 (2006). 
 49. Id. § 6307a. 
 50. See Charles Jay, Kill the Bill—the NJ Question, BOXING INSIDER, 
http://www.boxinginsider.net/columns/stories/69248859.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (quoting one 
state boxing commissioner as saying, “I really don’t see any reason to stay with them (the ABC).  When 
you look at the people running the thing, they’re all from states that just don’t have any significant 
boxing to speak of—Missouri, Oklahoma, Nebraska, et cetera.  In their states, their standards are lower 
than mine.”). 
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education and meager means endemic among boxers, it is unreasonable to expect 
them to recognize or assert any contractual right provided by the Ali Act.51  As will 
be seen throughout this Article, there is a considerable and debilitating gap between 
the rights and protections granted by the Ali Act and boxers’ familiarity 
therewith.52  Finally, and most fatally, the Ali Act does not even require that the 
ABC’s guidelines be adopted.  Rather, the Act meekly suggests that “[i]t is the 
sense of the Congress that State boxing commissions should follow these ABC 
guidelines.”53  Ultimately, this entire provision of the Ali Act amounts to Congress 
gently suggesting that state boxing commissions follow guidelines developed by a 
“non-profit group with no regulatory power over state boxing commissions” that is, 
in itself, just a loose affiliation of those same state commissions.54 
2.  Making Coercive Contracts Unenforceable 
The next provision of the Ali Act is aimed at option contracts, defined as “a 
contract provision that grants any rights between a boxer and a promoter . . . if the 
boxer is required to grant such rights . . . as a condition precedent to the boxer’s 
participation in a professional boxing match against another boxer who is under 
contract to the promoter.”55  Such option contracts may not be for a period greater 
than twelve months.56  This provision was included to combat the “common 
practice [of] a promoter who had successful boxers under contract to require that 
any challenger who sought to fight one of these boxers sign a long-term agreement 
with the promoter.”57  For example, in 1996 Evander Holyfield was forced to sign a 
long-term promotional contract with Don King before being afforded the 
opportunity to challenge heavyweight champion Mike Tyson, already one of 
King’s men.58 
Because option contracts are usually proposed in the context of title fights, it is 
more likely that the class of boxers to whom this provision applies—those at the 
stage of their careers where they have a chance to fight for the championship of 
their respective weight divisions— will have the resources, management team and 
experience in the industry to avail themselves of the statutory protection.  However, 
two problems persist.  First, an experienced promoter would seemingly have little 
problem drafting a contract that provides him options in the boxer challenging the 
champion under his control, without making such options a condition precedent to 
the challenger’s participation in the championship match.  Indeed, “promoters have 
 
 51. See, e.g., Baglio, supra note 20, at 2260 (“Most boxers are uneducated men who come from 
impoverished backgrounds.”). 
 52. Burstein, supra note 9, at 461 (“[I]n order for a fighter to sue under the Ali Act, he must first 
know of its existence and its provisions.  It is doubtful that the typical fighter will have such 
knowledge.”). 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 6307a. 
 54. Burstein, supra note 9, at 445. 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 6307b(a)(B). 
 56. Id. § 6307b(a)(1)(A)(i). 
 57. McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 20. 
 58. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1207. 
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become quite skilled in duping boxers into signing long term contracts that 
represent nothing more than a sophisticated version of indentured servitude.”59  
Insofar as champions and their promoters have discretion in choosing challengers, 
they may still pressure potential opponents into signing option contracts without 
explicitly making their accession thereto a condition precedent to the championship 
fight.  In fact, “[b]oxers often agree to these types of coercive contracts for fear of 
being blackballed by the promoter.”60  Second, the Ali Act simply makes option 
contracts unenforceable.  Thus, while a boxer signed to an option contract 
ultimately will not have to perform under that contract, it is likely that a promoter 
will force that boxer to establish his Ali Act rights in court.  As will be discussed in 
further detail in Part II, litigation of any duration can be devastating to boxers 
because of the brevity of their careers and their need to stay active in order to 
maintain or advance their rankings.61  For example, even after a trial court 
determined that then-welterweight champion Felix Trinidad had presented 
sufficient questions of fact to proceed with a contract claim against his promoter, 
Don King, Trinidad agreed to continue under the disputed agreement so as not to 
“waste the prime of his career fighting in court.”62 
While the provision of the Ali Act addressing option contracts takes direct aim 
at a pervasive and coercive tactic employed by promoters, it is unclear that it lands 
anything more than a glancing blow.  In the end, the provision will likely act as 
little more than a drafting rule for wily promoters and the foundation of a dilemma 
for aggrieved fighters who must choose whether to be active in court or in the ring. 
3.  Disclosure of Compensation 
The Ali Act contains various disclosure provisions, requiring promoters to 
“provide[] to the boxing commission responsible for regulating the match in a 
State”:  1) a “copy of any agreement in writing to which the promoter is a party 
with any boxer participating in the match,” and 2) “a statement made under penalty 
of perjury that there are no other agreements, written or oral, between the promoter 
and the boxer with respect to that match.”63  Furthermore, a promoter must provide 
“to the boxer it promotes . . . the amounts of any compensation or consideration 
that a promoter has contracted to receive from such match.”64  These disclosure 
provisions aim to board off “the back room dealings that . . . dominate boxing 
negotiations” and to create “more open and equitable transactions” between boxers 
and promoters by reducing the asymmetry of information that persists between the 
two at the negotiating table.65 
 
 59. Ali Act Hearings, supra note 32, at 7 (statement of Sen. John McCain). 
 60. McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 20. 
 61. See, e.g., Burstein, supra note 9 (discussing the dangers litigation presents to boxers). 
 62. Trinidad v. King, No. 98 CIV. 4518, 1998 WL 823653, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1998); 
Baglio, supra note 20, at 2274. 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 6307e(a) (2006). 
 64. Id. § 6307e(b). 
 65. Baglio, supra note 20, at 2285. 
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While sunlight may be the best disinfectant, it is not enough—in and of itself—
to cleanse boxing of coercive and unethical contracts.66  Disclosing contracts to 
state boxing commissions will be effective in promoting fair contracts among 
promoters and boxers only to the extent that the commissions actually review every 
contract submitted to them and invalidate those that are coercive or unconscionable.  
However, “some states simply are not aggressive in enforcing the requirements 
related to formation of contracts.”67  This “lack of aggressiveness on the part of the 
states [may be] due to a lack of resources or the [un]willingness to investigate 
wrongdoing.”68  As discussed above, there is a nexus between politicians, 
promoters and state boxing commissioners that casts doubt on the ability of 
politically appointed commissioners to act contrary to promoters’ interests.  Not 
only are promoters sometimes valued campaign contributors, but often they directly 
patronize state boxing commissioners.69  In Nevada, for example, “each of the 
state’s five commissioners is given six tickets [by promoters] in addition to his own 
set for every fight card held in the state.”70  Two of these seats must be ringside.71  
The value of these seats can be substantial.  For the Oscar De La Hoya v. Floyd 
Mayweather fight, “six ringside tickets had a face value of $12,000 and were being 
resold on the Internet and elsewhere for multiples of that amount.”72  Thus, while 
the Ali Act requires contracts between boxers and promoters to be brought to light, 
it is unlikely that illumination will result in equalization. 
Perhaps the most ill conceived and ineffective provision of the Ali Act is § 
6307e(b), which requires promoters to disclose to boxers “the amounts of any 
compensation or consideration that a promoter has contracted to receive” from a 
match.73  Ostensibly, this requirement “removes a significant portion of the 
promoter’s power during . . . negotiations by allowing the boxer to know exactly 
how much a bout is worth to the promoter, thus enabling a boxer to negotiate larger 
purses for himself.”74  The provision inexplicably requires a promoter to disclose 
his gross, rather than net profits to a boxer.  Thus, “the disclosure is misleading 
because a boxer may assume that the promoter is keeping all of the revenue, while 
in actuality the boxers’ purses, fees, and expenses from the bout, along with 
company overhead, must be subtracted before determination of the promoter’s 
profit or loss.”75  Likely, a boxer’s misperception of a promoter’s profit margin will 
lead to negotiating gridlock, increased transaction costs and aborted bouts where no 
 
 66. See LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 13 (1913). 
 67. Moore, supra note 16, at 219. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Here it should be noted again that Senator Harry Reid called Don King and Bob Arum his 
“two most important constituents.”  See Fife, supra note 32, at 1310 n.88 (citing Baglio, supra note 20, 
at 2281). 
 70. Hauser, supra note 11. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 6307e(b) (2006). 
 74. Baglio, supra note 20, at 2284. 
 75. Id. at 2285. 
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agreement can be reached.76  Further, “[i]f the promoter, in addition to a main event 
fighter, has a contract with an undercard boxer, he must make the disclosures to 
him also.  The undercard boxer, however, is not as responsible for most of the 
revenue the promoter receives.”77  Once again, this disclosure requirement may 
lead to a boxer misapprehending his true leverage and worth.  Ultimately, this 
“false sense of leverage could compromise the entire event” by leading boxers to 
demand contract provisions that are out of proportion to their true value to the 
promotion.78 
Though well intentioned, the disclosure provisions of the Ali Act are ill suited to 
achieving their purposes.  First, while requiring the promoter to disclose contracts 
and financial information to state boxing commissions, the Act does not require 
those commissions to review the disclosures, nor does it set up any protocol 
mandating how those commissions should act when encountering coercive or 
unethical contract provisions.  Thus, the disclosure provision is merely a good first 
step that, lacking an essential second step, ends up leading nowhere.  Second, 
because the Act mandates the disclosure of gross income, it is essentially 
“meaningless . . . . [While n]et receipts might mean something . . . gross receipts 
[are] totally meaningless.”79  Requiring a promoter to disclose his gross income 
from a bout to a fighter will only create a chilled negotiating climate in which the 
boxer has an inflated sense of the promoter’s profit margin, and thus greatly 
misperceives his own worth.80  This provision would have been more valuable to 
boxers if it mandated net receipts, thereby providing useful and relevant 
information that would strengthen their bargaining positions.  Instead, it merely 
sends them marching to the negotiating table overconfident in their position, power 
and worth. 
4.  Firewall Between Promoters and Managers 
As discussed, managers owe a fiduciary duty to the boxers they represent.  
Promoters owe no such duty.  In fact, “a boxer and a promoter have directly 
adverse interests during [contract] negotiations.”81  Thus, it is essential that a 
firewall between promoters and managers exists so that the latter can negotiate 
 
 76. See Cristina E. Groschel, Note, Down for the Count:  The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act 
and Its Shortcomings¸ 26 NOVA L. REV. 927, 945–46 (2002) (“In seeing a promoter’s gross revenue, 
boxers get a false sense of their true worth.  They begin to believe that they have greater leverage than 
they actually do.”). 
 77. Id. at 946. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (citing Legis. Meeting of the Pa. State Athletic Comm’n in Ass’n with the Ass’n of Boxing 
Comm’ns 151 (2000) [hereinafter Legislative Meeting] (statement of Patrick English, Attorney for Main 
Events)). 
 80. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 79, at 195 (statement of Ron Stevens) (“[T]he fighter is 
going to say . . . hey . . . [y]ou are making $10 million.  I deserve 50,000 here, not 5,000.”); id. at 209 
(statement of Murad Muhammad) (“[W]e would have . . . major trouble because you don’t understand 
these athletes  . . . [I]f they ever see the kind of money . . . grossed in a fight, I guarantee you . . . when 
that fighter reads that, I am not fighting.”). 
 81. Baglio, supra note 20, at 2285. 
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aggressively against the former in the best interests of the represented boxer.  This 
is especially true because of the lack of education, sophistication and legal 
knowledge common among boxers.  The Ali Act establishes such a firewall 
through its provision “forbidding both a promoter from having any interest in the 
management of the boxer, and a manager from having an interest in the promotion 
of the boxer.”82 
This interdiction is meant to obviate the traditional practice in boxing under 
which “many of the most powerful promoters force boxers to hire a particular 
manager, usually an employee or family member of the promoter, whose loyalty is 
to the promoter and not to the boxer, thus compromising the boxer’s interests 
during negotiations with the promoter.”83  Don King was perhaps the most 
notorious proponent of this unsavory tactic, often requiring boxers to hire his son, 
Carl King, as their manager as a condition precedent to being promoted by the elder 
King. Once installed, Carl King routinely took fifty percent or more from purses of 
boxers that he managed and his father promoted.84  More troubling, the boxer 
would then be represented by Carl King in negotiations against his own father, by 
whom the younger King was also employed.85  Under such circumstances, it is 
impossible for anyone, including the boxer, to believe that his best interests were 
being pursued faithfully by his manager.  Thus, the firewall provision of the Ali 
Act represents a pragmatic and effective solution to one of the underlying reasons 
why boxers are often subjected to coercive and inequitable contracts.86 
Like the disclosure provisions of the Act discussed above, the firewall provision 
is directed not at the substantive terms of contracts, but in how they are formed.  By 
ensuring that boxers are more vigorously and faithfully represented by their 
managers during contract negotiations, the Ali Act assures that the fruits of those 
negotiations are more substantively fair.  Naturally, it may still be possible for 
shifty promoters to set up shell companies and thereby force boxers to retain 
conflicted management.  Further, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the 
recurring problems of educating boxers about this provision and facilitating their 
exercise of the rights it guarantees persist here—as they do with respect to the 
provision banning option contracts lasting more than a year. 
B.  RANKINGS PROVISIONS 
The Ali Act also addresses the manipulation and corruption of rankings 
promulgated by sanctioning organizations.  Historically, rankings have been 
“arbitrarily designated and altered, often promoting the financial interests of 
 
 82. Id. at 2283. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See NEWFIELD, supra note 2, at 209, 233, 241 (citing numerous examples of this practice). 
 85. See PETER HELLER, BAD INTENTIONS:  THE MIKE TYSON STORY 218 (1989) (quoting boxer 
Alfonso Ratliff, who said, “Carl [King] became my manager because Don King said the only way he 
would promote me was to have his son be my manager.  I didn’t want anything to do with Carl King, but 
I had no choice.”). 
 86. 15 U.S.C. § 6308(b) (2006). 
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boxing’s most powerful promoters, who have been accused of bribing sanctioning 
organization officials in order to secure a particular ranking for their boxer.”87  The 
Ali Act takes a two-headed approach towards eliminating the arbitrariness and 
corruption pervasive in boxing rankings.  First, as it did when requiring minimal 
contractual guidelines, the Act once again gives the ABC two years to “develop 
and . . . approve . . . guidelines for objective and consistent written criteria for the 
ratings of professional boxers.”88  However, the Act once again does not require 
sanctioning bodies and state boxing commissions to adopt these guidelines.  Rather, 
the provision humbly advises that “[i]t is the sense of the Congress that sanctioning 
bodies and State boxing commissions should follow these ABC guidelines.”89  As 
discussed above, the ABC is “merely a non-profit group with no regulatory power 
over state boxing commissions,” comprised of politically appointed boxing 
commissioners who maintain close ties with affluent and influential promoters.90  
The rankings criteria ultimately promulgated by the ABC represented a 
compromise between states that wanted a detailed and strict set of guidelines, and 
those that wanted to leave sanctioning bodies as much discretion as possible.  
Unsurprisingly then, the ABC’s rankings guidelines are little more than vague 
reiterations of criteria ostensibly used by sanctioning organizations. 
In the main, the ABC requires rankings to be based “solely on win/loss records, 
level of competition and activity.”91  The ABC fleshes out this skeletal guideline 
with a few added provisions, stating, for example, that “if two boxers are rated and 
compete against each other, and the lower rated boxer wins: a) The lower rated 
boxer shall be elevated in the ratings and; b) The higher rated boxer shall be 
lowered in the ratings.”92  The guidelines also forbid premising the rating of a 
boxer, “directly or indirectly, upon a consideration of . . . [t]he identity of the 
boxer’s promoter, manager or any other person with whom the boxer is 
affiliated.”93 
Despite these slightly more specific guidelines, the ABC’s rankings 
requirements remain little more than sparse road marks on a long and notoriously 
winding highway.  There is no guidance, for example, on how to consider one 
boxer’s win/loss record as compared to another’s.  Should a boxer who has thirty 
wins and two losses have a higher or lower ranking than one who has fifteen wins 
and no defeats?  To the extent that both boxers’ level of competition is considered 
in determining who should have a higher ranking, how is that taken into account?  
Should a split decision victory over a top five fighter be given more weight than a 
knockout victory over the tenth ranked fighter?  Importantly, the people making 
these judgment calls are sanctioning body officials.  Essentially, the Ali Act 
 
 87. Baglio, supra note 20, at 2285. 
 88. 15 U.S.C. § 6307c(a). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Burstein, supra note 9, at 445. 
 91. ABC Rating Criteria, ASS’N BOXING COMMISSIONS, http://www.abcboxing.com/abc_ 
ratings_criteria.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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suggests that the very bodies who initially promulgated “preposterous” rankings 
that had “less credibility and confidence among the boxers and the fans than any 
other sports rating system in the world” now justify those rankings according to 
nonbinding guidelines that remain vague enough to allow corruption and favoritism 
to masquerade as discretion.94  
Of course, other sports—particularly college sports—also base their rankings on 
a combination of subjective and objective factors.  Just as it would be impossible 
for all 120 Division I college football teams to play each other in order to determine 
which team should truly be ranked number one, it is likewise impossible for any 
boxer to fight every other boxer in his weight class in order to establish himself as 
its undisputed champion.95  Therefore, boxing rankings, like rankings in other 
sports, are based on a combination of objective factors (win/loss record and 
opponents’ win/loss record) and subjective factors (margin of victory and 
subjective quality of opponent).  However, the difference between the poll system 
prevailing in other sports and the rankings system used in boxing is that the former 
is “determined by newspaper writers who cover the particular sport . . . [who have] 
no financial interest in the outcome of the rankings process.”96  By contrast, boxing 
“tends to produce questionable or controversial rankings because they are often 
manipulated by parties with a financial interest in the outcome of the rankings.”97  
Like college football, boxing would be well served by a system that delegates 
responsibility for making subjective rankings to those without a financial interest in 
the rating system—perhaps retired boxers and boxing writers and historians.98  That 
subjective ranking system could also be combined with a computer ranking based 
on objective factors, similar to the methodology employed by the Bowl 
Championship Series.99  Instead of mandating any real, effective change, the 
provisions of the Ali Act addressing rankings corruption will likely only force 
sanctioning bodies to be slightly more formulaic and slightly less opaque in 
promulgating their rankings. 
One of the very few cases brought under the Ali Act demonstrates just how 
difficult it is to establish that a sanctioning body has promulgated rankings that 
disregard either its own rankings criteria, or the criteria it has adopted directly from 
the ABC.100  In Klitschko v. International Boxing Federation, Inc., Wladimir 
Klitschko sought a preliminary injunction requiring the IBF to designate him as the 
 
 94. Symposium, supra note 17, at 210 (statement of Paul Feeney). 
 95. See Ranking Every FBS Team from 1 to 120, SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM (Aug. 12, 2009, 
11:04 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/football/ncaa/08/10/rankings/index.html. 
 96. Baglio, supra note 20, at 2267. 
 97. Id. 
 98. McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 22 (discussing the National Associationn of Attorneys 
General’s suggestion that “a private organization comprised of writers, broadcasters, and historians . . . 
rank boxers.”). 
 99. See BCS Standings Methodology, BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES (Jan. 21, 2010 3:33 PM), 
http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4765845. 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 6307c(d)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring sanctioning bodies to submit to the Federal 
Trade Commission and to the ABC “a complete description of the organization’s ratings criteria, 
policies, and general sanctioning fee schedule”). 
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next IBF mandatory challenger against whom the reigning heavyweight champion 
must defend his title.101  The IBF had bypassed Klitschko and instead designated 
DaVarryl Williamson as its mandatory challenger.  Klitschko—who, incidentally is 
the current heavyweight champion as of this writing—filed his complaint after the 
IBF issued its May 2005 rankings in which Williamson was promoted from the 
fourth to the third ranked heavyweight boxer, while Klitschko was demoted from 
the third to the fourth spot in the division.102  While both fighters had won their last 
fights, Klitschko’s last opponent had a record of eighteen wins, zero losses and one 
draw bolstered by a victory over Williamson himself, while Williamson’s last 
opponent had a more modest record of eleven wins and eleven losses and was in 
the midst of a seven fight losing streak (six of those losses coming by knockout).103  
Klitschko claimed that Williamson’s superior ranking was due to the fact that he 
was represented by Don King, and not based on IBF rating criteria, including 
“boxers’ win/loss records, level of competition, and activity.”104 
In analyzing Klitschko’s claim that the IBF had violated the Ali Act by 
promulgating rankings not in accord with their adopted criteria, the court first 
stated that it “must . . . ordinarily defer to the internal decisions of private 
organizations such as the IBF.”105  Already, Klitschko was fighting with one hand 
tied behind his back.  Next, the court established a nearly impossible burden of 
proof for Klitschko to meet, stating that the IBF’s rankings did not “evidence plain 
disregard of any IBF rule.”106  It is unclear exactly what ranking decision would 
meet that “plain disregard” standard.  Before the disputed rankings, Klitschko was 
ranked higher than Williamson.  Klitschko and Williamson both won their next 
fights; thus, both of their win/loss records progressed in tandem.  Similarly, they 
both maintained the same level of activity—they both had one fight.  Therefore, 
under the three criteria purportedly considered by the IBF—win/loss records, 
activity and level of competition—only that last criterion, level of competition, 
could be the variable producing the rankings change.  Yet, Klitschko defeated a 
theretofore undefeated fighter who had a victory over Williamson on his resume, 
while Williamson beat a fighter with as many losses as wins, and who had been 
knocked out in six of his last seven fights. 
Given the record before the court, it is hard to imagine any rankings decision by 
the IBF that could “evidence plain disregard of any” ratings criteria more than the 
one giving rise to Klitschko’s complaint.  Falling back on the canard that “the 
application of [the IBF’s] objective criteria is a subjective enterprise,” the court 
held that while it “may be troubled by the conflicts of interest within the industry 
 
 101. Klitschko v. Int’l Boxing Fed’n, Inc., No. 05-CV-2578, 2005 WL 1638154, at *1 (D.N.J. July 
11, 2005). 
 102. The first and second ranked heavyweight boxers were ineligible to fight for the title at the 
time the disputed rankings were promulgated.  Thus, the third ranked boxer was deemed the mandatory 
challenger.  See id. at *1, *2. 
 103. Id. at *1, *4 n.1. 
 104. Id. at *3. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at *4. 
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and the appearance of impropriety that exists due to the dominance of certain 
promoters, none of this establishes a clear violation of any IBF rule entitling 
Klitschko to preliminary injunctive relief.”107  Considering that level of 
competition may ultimately be a “subjective enterprise,” no reasonable person 
could consider Williamson’s latest opponent to be on par with Klitschko’s.  
Perhaps, if a boxer displaced by Damien Moore in the WBO’s rankings had sued 
under the Ali Act during Moore’s miraculous posthumous ascendancy, the court 
would have found “plain disregard” of the WBO’s sanctioning criteria.108 
By allowing sanctioning bodies to largely retain discretion in promulgating 
rankings, the Ali Act does little to stamp out the corruption and manipulation that 
has historically influenced those rankings.  The Ali Act will continue to be 
especially ineffective in this area if courts continue to grant so much deference to 
the internal decisions of sanctioning organizations in disseminating rankings.  Once 
again, the Ali Act is shown to be little more than a trap for the unwary or 
unsophisticated promoter or sanctioning body, rather than a sweeping instrument of 
reform. 
C.  PIECEMEAL STATE REGULATION 
In its findings section, the Ali Act states that while “State officials are the proper 
regulators of professional boxing events . . . . [p]romoters who engage in illegal, 
coercive, or unethical business practices can take advantage of the lack of equitable 
business standards in the sport by holding boxing events in States with weaker 
regulatory oversight.”109  Further, the Act states as one of its purposes “assist[ing] 
State boxing commissions in their efforts to provide more effective public oversight 
of the sport.”110  Yet, even after the Act’s passage, professional boxing only has a 
“varying degree of oversight depending on the resources and priorities of each 
state . . . commission.”111  This “lack [of] uniformity” gives state boxing 
commissions an incentive to promulgate and enforce lax regulations that bring 
boxing business into their states.112  In turn, boxers and promoters are encouraged 
to “forum shop” among the various state commissions in order to obtain licenses or 
to perpetuate unfair business practices with a minimum of oversight or 
interference.113  According to Senator John McCain, one of the Ali Act’s sponsors, 
“[t]his vacuum of state regulation invite[s] forum shopping by unscrupulous 
promoters and managers and also provide[s] a fertile breeding ground for fixed 
bouts, the exploitation of boxers, and a lack of adequate medical services at many 
events.”114  In sum, the “lack of consistency in compliance with federal boxing law 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. The Moore incident occurred after the Ali Act was passed.  See Jurek, supra note 7, at 1214; 
see also supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 109. H.R. REP. NO. 106-449, pt. 1, at 2 (1999). 
 110. Id. 
 111. McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 23. 
 112. Fife, supra note 32, at 1305. 
 113. Id.; see supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 114. McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 19. 
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among state . . . commissions ‘does not provide adequate assurance that 
professional boxers are receiving the minimum protections established in federal 
law.’”115 
The reason boxers have not been adequately assured of the minimum protections 
established in federal law is that the Congress, while recognizing that 
“[p]romoters . . . take advantage of the lack of equitable business standards in the 
sport by holding boxing events in States with weaker regulatory oversight,” also 
found that “State officials are the proper regulators of professional boxing 
events.”116  Because of this federalism concern, the Ali Act does not seek to 
preempt any state licensing requirements or impose on state boxing commissions 
any affirmative duties.  Rather, the act modestly seeks to “assist State boxing 
commissions in their efforts to provide more effective public oversight of the sport” 
by helping them to “receive adequate information to determine whether boxers 
competing in their jurisdiction are being subjected to contract terms and business 
practices which may violate State regulations, or are onerous and confiscatory.”117  
Various provisions of the Ali Act are intended to provide “adequate information” to 
the States, including those requiring disclosures to state boxing commissions by 
sanctioning organizations, promoters and judges.118 
As stated, the Ali Act does not impose any affirmative duties on state boxing 
commissions with regard to the information its provisions provide them.  Thus, 
while a promoter may be required to disclose a coercive or unethical contract under 
the Ali Act, no corresponding provision requires the state commission to review the 
contract, much less either void it or sanction the promoter.  Given the troubling 
nexus between state boxing commissioners, the politicians who appoint them and 
the promoters who fill those politicians’ campaign coffers, as well as the 
commissions’ lack of resources and general unwillingness to investigate 
wrongdoing, simply mandating the disclosure of information without imposing a 
corresponding duty to act thereon is like requiring firefighters to drive their truck to 
a burning house, but not take any steps to put out the flames they encounter. 
The Ali Act, does, however, empower “the chief law enforcement officer of any 
State . . . as parens patriae . . . [to] bring a civil action on behalf of its residents” to 
“enforce compliance with” the Act or to “obtain the fines provided” by the Act.119  
In addition, the Ali Act provides for a private right of action for “[a]ny boxer who 
suffers economic injury as a result of a violation of any provision of [the] Act” that 
may be brought in “Federal or State court.”120  Thus, while not requiring state 
 
 115. Id. at 23 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROFESSIONAL BOXING:  ISSUES RELATED 
TO THE PROTECTION OF BOXERS’ HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS, 7 (2003) [hereinafter 
GAO REPORT]; see also April R. Anderson, The Punch That Landed:  The Professional Boxing Safety 
Act of 1996, 9 MARQ. SPORTS. L.J. 191, 193 (1998) (“[W]hile individual states may have created 
commissions that promulgate regulations, there is no consistency, no minimal requirements that set the 
floor for acceptable policies and procedures.”). 
 116. H.R. REP. NO. 106-449, pt. 1, at 2 (1999). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. 15 U.S.C. § 6309(c) (2006). 
 120. Id. § 6309(d). 
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boxing commissions to review any information mandatorily disclosed to them, nor 
requiring them to prosecute or sanction any violations of the Ali Act discovered 
upon such a review, the Act does at least provide state commissions and individual 
boxers with a federal cause of action to bring upon discovering a violation of one of 
its provisions.  However, as will be discussed at length below, no state or United 
States Attorney has prosecuted an Ali Act violation, and the number of boxers who 
have brought suit could all fit comfortably within an eighteen square foot ring.121 
It is worth noting the Ali Act’s peculiar and measured deference to states’ rights 
to regulate boxing, especially given the Congress’s repeated references to the effect 
of boxing on interstate commerce.122  Under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States.”123  Further, in United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, 
Inc., the Supreme Court held that Congress could regulate the sport because 
professional boxing revenues are predominantly derived from interstate broadcasts 
and promoters use the channels of interstate commerce in order to negotiate 
contracts, lease arenas and maintain training quarters.124  Such regulation is still 
permissible even in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions restricting 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause because “professional boxing 
occurs on interstate, national, even international levels.”125  Under Gonzales v. 
Raich, Congress may regulate purely intrastate noneconomic activity if it has a 
“rational basis” for concluding that the activity “substantially affect[s] interstate 
commerce.”126  Undoubtedly, even “local boxing has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.  Rankings are determined by a boxer’s total record, regardless 
of where the match is held, and boxers use local fights to affect their national 
rankings.”127  Moreover, “promoters and boxers frequently use the channels of 
interstate commerce to circumvent state health and safety regulations.”128 
Given Congress’s seemingly irrefutable power to regulate boxing under the 
Commerce Clause, the Ali Act’s limp regulation of  “an industry historically 
governed by the states” can only be explained by a hesitancy to preempt an aspect 
of the states’ inherent police power.129  However, it is apparent that Congress, in 
 
 121. The minimum permissible size for a professional boxing ring is eighteen square feet.  See 
Standard Measurements in Sports, INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0113430.html (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 122. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-449, pt. 1, at 2 (1999) (“Common practices of promoters and 
sanctioning organizations represent restraints of interstate trade in the United States.”); id. (“The 
purposes of this Act are to protect the rights and welfare of professional boxers on an interstate basis.”). 
 123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 124. United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y, Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 241, 247 (1955). 
 125. Anderson, supra note 115, at 193.  See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 126. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
 127. McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 13. 
 128. Id. 
 129. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 1031 (3d ed. 2004); see 
Muhammad Ali v. Div. of State Athletic Comm’n of Dep’t of State of N.Y., 308 F. Supp. 11, 16 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (stating that a state has “obviously sweeping powers . . . to regulate” boxing, including 
the power of “total prohibition”). 
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propounding the Ali Act, gave too much weight to federalism concerns at the 
expense of viable and effective protections for boxers.  As will be discussed in Part 
III, pending federal boxing legislation preempts much of the states’ powers to 
regulate boxing in order to establish true and meaningful “consistency in 
compliance with federal boxing law among state . . . commissions.”130  Before 
analyzing possible solutions to boxing’s persistent problems in Part III, this Article 
will next examine more generalized failures of the Ali Act to expurgate the “dark 
and corrupt business” of boxing.131 
II.  WHY THE ALI ACT LACKS PUNCH 
Part I addressed the Ali Act’s shortcomings with regards to standards embodied 
in specific provisions.  Part II will now discuss overarching deficiencies in the Act 
that have made it largely impotent and irrelevant.  Those deficiencies are rooted in: 
1) the Act’s lack of enforcement, and the underlying reasons therefore; 2) the 
inexplicable loopholes throughout the Act that provide less meaningful protection 
for “blue collar” boxers than that received by their more affluent and well insulated 
counterparts; and 3) the Act’s anonymity among those it is intended to protect.132  
Necessarily, some of the issues discussed in Part I will be folded into the analysis 
offered in Part II; likewise, there is a natural interrelatedness between the three 
shortcomings discussed. 
A.  LACK OF ENFORCEMENT 
By any objective criterion, the Ali Act is not being enforced, either through 
federal or state actors, or through private actions.  Though the Ali Act provides for 
enforcement by State Attorneys General, the federal Department of Justice and 
United States Attorneys are “primar[ily]” responsible for enforcing the Act.133  
Despite the fact that the Ali Act provides for considerable criminal sanctions, the 
Justice Department has yet to bring even a single indictment for a violation of any 
of the Act’s provisions.134  The lack of indictments under the Act should not be 
mistaken for confirmation that it is producing its desired deterrent effect.  
According to Tim Lueckenhoff, president of the ABC, his organization frequently 
alerts the Justice Department to violations of the Ali Act, yet gets “no help 
whatsoever from U.S. Attorneys around the country.”135  Prosecutors have wide 
discretion when deciding whether or not to bring a criminal case, and one report 
 
 130. McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 23. 
 131. Id. at 8. 
 132. Fife, supra note 32, at 1302 (citing Hastings, supra note 35). 
 133. Hauser, supra note 11. 
 134. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 6309(b)(2) (2006) (providing for “imprison[ment] for not more than one 
year or [a] fine[] not more than $100,000” for violating antiexploitation or disclosure provisions of the 
Ali Act). 
 135. Hauser, supra note 11 (quoting Tim Lueckenhoff) (“I’ve made at least 10 referrals to U.S. 
Attorney’s offices around the country and haven’t found anyone who was willing to go to court to 
enforce the law.”). 
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blamed the “lack of prosecutions under federal boxing law” on the fact that 
“violations of these laws are misdemeanors, which do not receive significant 
resources from the [Department of Justice].”136  Nonetheless, it must be troubling 
to the legislators who passed the Ali Act to learn that no indictments have been 
brought under its provisions in the decade since it was enacted into law.  After all, 
“[w]ithout proper enforcement [the Ali Act is] useless.”137 
Enforcement has been just as nonexistent on the state level.138  Once again, the 
relationship between the state boxing commissioners charged with reviewing 
disclosures made by the promoters who contribute to the politicians who appoint 
the commissioners is likely one reason why those same commissioners so rarely, if 
ever, alert state attorneys general as to violations of the Ali Act.  Moreover, the 
“state attorneys general and state boxing commissions are most likely not equipped 
to enforce the Ali Act.  Not every state has a boxing commission, and for those that 
do, it is generally agreed that they are understaffed and under-funded.”139  No 
wonder one commentator compared the Ali Act to a “New York City jaywalking 
statute”; it seems Don King is more likely to be fined for skirting across Lexington 
Avenue than for coercing boxers into illegal contracts.140 
The Ali Act also empowers an aggrieved boxer to “bring an action in the 
appropriate Federal or State court and recover damages suffered, court costs, and 
reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses.”141  However, the “idea that the fighters 
being injured by violations of the Ali Act will bring suits against the promoters and 
sanctioning bodies that are exploiting them is completely unrealistic.”142  The boxer 
must first be aware that he has even been injured; illegal contract provisions are not 
always as obvious as a blow to the head.  Then, “in order for a fighter to sue under 
the Ali Act, he must . . . know of its existence and its provisions.”143  
Unfortunately, most fighters are unlikely to know of either the Act or the rights it 
provides.144 
Even if the boxer is aware of his injury and knows that the Ali Act provides him 
with a cause of action, “the obstacles to bringing suit against a promoter, manager 
or sanctioning body under the Act are substantial.”145  The litigious boxer must first 
face the prospect of being blacklisted by the “promoters and sanctioning bodies 
[who] control any and all fighting opportunities.”146  The fear of being blacklisted 
 
 136. McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 23 (citing GAO REPORT, supra note 115, at 5).  See 
generally Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 137. Review of the Professional Boxing Industry—Is Further Reform Needed?:  Hearing Before 
the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 107th Cong. 8 (2001) (statement of Patrick English, 
Attorney for Main Events). 
 138. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1189. 
 139. Burstein, supra note 9, at 462. 
 140. Id. at 459. 
 141. 15 U.S.C. § 6309(d) (2006). 
 142. Burstein, supra note 9, at 461. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 461–62. 
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is not a token fit of paranoia.  In fact, some of boxing’s most powerful and wealthy 
stars have lost their congenital courageousness when faced with the prospect of 
going up against the sport’s controlling promoters and sanctioning bodies.147 
A maltreated boxer who still wishes to fight faces the further logistical problem 
of actually bringing suit.  If the hypothetical boxer is one of the thousands of 
fighters who earn “as little as $200–$400 per fight,” it is unlikely that he will be 
able to sustain the costs of litigation.148  Unsurprisingly, then, of the over 100 
lawsuits brought against Don King between 1978 and 1995, two were settled and 
the balance was simply dropped due to lack of funds necessary to pursue 
litigation.149  It follows that “the only fighters who will bring claims under the Ali 
Act are those rich and successful enough to afford their own counsel.”150  The 
background facts giving rise to the relevant case law bears out this hypothesis.  
Each of the cases in the very small constellation of Ali Act claims brought by 
boxers involved a star.151  That is to say, the plaintiff in every case brought under 
the Ali Act was a former or future champion—Wladimir Klitschko, Bernard 
Hopkins, Lennox Lewis and Manny Pacquiao—or a top ranked contender—
Soulemayne M’Baye, Nicolai Valuev and Antwun Echols.152  If the preceding list 
of plaintiffs were turned into a pay-per-view card, it would undoubtedly be the 
highest grossing event of all time.  Unfortunately, the prohibitive costs of litigation 
are not the only reason why the Ali Act provides greater protection for the haves of 
boxing than for the have nots. 
B.  LACK OF PROTECTION FOR “BLUE COLLAR” BOXERS 
While “[p]rofessional boxing is a multi-billion dollar industry,” “[m]ost boxing 
matches feature unknown journeymen . . . who apply their trade for small crowds in 
exchange for nominal purse amounts.”153  It is these fighters who are most in need 
of protection.  They are the ones most willing to overlook unfavorable contract 
terms in the hopes of getting the chance to fight on ever-bigger stages.  They are 
the ones who cannot afford to hire independent legal counsel to review and 
 
 147. For example, Roy Jones, Jr., one of boxing’s most decorated, famous and prosperous 
champions refused to testify on the issue of boxing reform when called before a Senate committee 
because he feared retaliation.  See Symposium, supra note 17, at 255 (statement of Greg Sirb). 
 148. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1192. 
 149. NEWFIELD, supra note 2, at 247. 
 150. Burstein, supra note 9, at 462. 
 151. After assiduous research, the author discovered only ten cases brought by boxers under the 
Ali Act.  Of those ten cases, one was dismissed on summary judgment because it was brought by a 
“manager, promoter, and/or trainer of boxers” and was thus not under the Act’s ambit.  See Peete v. 
Thompson, No. 4:06CV112-M-B, 2007 WL 2727256 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 17, 2007). 
 152. Echols v. Pelullo, 377 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2004); M’Baye v. World Boxing Ass’n, No. 05 Civ. 
9581, 2007 WL 844552 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2007); O’Donnell v. Shalayev, No. Civ.A. 01-4721, 2006 
WL 3069011 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2006); Klitschko v. Int’l Boxing Fed’n, No. 05-CV-2578, 2005 WL 
1638154 (D.N.J. July 11, 2005); Pacquiao v. M & M Sports, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 4200, 2005 WL 1539281 
(S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2005); Don King Prods., Inc. v. Hopkins, No. 04 Civ. 9705, 2005 WL 1053336 
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2005); Lewis v. Rahman, 147 F. Supp. 2d 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 153. Baglio, supra note 20, at 2260; McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 8. 
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negotiate contract terms; and once they do sign an illegal or unethical contract, they 
are the ones least able to sustain the litigation necessary for a court to declare that 
contract unenforceable.  Yet, these same boxers are also the ones to whom the Ali 
Act denies some of its most important protections.  For example, only a boxer rated 
among an organization’s top ten contenders is required to receive notification of a 
change in his ranking.154  More detrimentally, the Ali Act does not extend its 
firewall provision—prohibiting a promoter from having “a direct or indirect 
financial interest in the management of a boxer,” or a manager from having “a 
direct or indirect financial interest in the promotion of a boxer”—to boxers 
participating in a boxing match of less than ten rounds.155  The ten round cut off, 
though seemingly innocuous to a layperson, means that the firewall provision only 
applies to championship-caliber fighters.  A boxer who has just turned professional 
will fight a series of four round bouts.  As his career progress, so will the duration 
of his fights, from four rounds to six rounds to eight rounds and, finally, to ten 
rounds.  Only championship fights are scheduled for more than ten rounds.  
Therefore, a boxer fighting in a bout scheduled for ten rounds or more is either 
fighting for the championship, or is boxing in the marquee bout on a fight card. 
The fighters involved in bouts of ten rounds or more are logically those who 
have the most experience in the industry, the greatest amount of negotiating 
leverage and the best opportunity to be represented by independent counsel.  In 
other words, they are the most affluent fighters in the sport.  That is not to say that 
they are not in need of whatever protections the Ali Act offers.  However, they 
certainly are not more in need of such protections than their poorer, less 
experienced, more vulnerable counterparts.156  Irrationally, the Ali Act withdraws 
one of its most important protections from those who need it most.157  Thus, not 
only is it more difficult for “blue collar” boxers to resort to litigation in order to 
enforce the Ali Act’s protective provisions, but also they are protected by fewer of 
its provisions. 
C.  THE ANONYMITY OF THE ALI ACT 
Entitlements and legal protections are only useful to the extent they are 
recognized and exercised by their intended beneficiaries.158  The Ali Act does not 
 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 6307c(c) (2006). 
 155. Id. § 6308(b) (noting that provision “only applies to boxers participating in a boxing match of 
10 rounds or more”). 
 156. Symposium, supra note 17, at 255 (statement of Marc Ratner).  In the words of Marc Ratner: 
I never understand why all the discussions are always about maybe 2% of the fighters who are 
world famous, the best fighters such as Evander Holyfield, and nobody talks about the 4’s and 
the 6’s, who are who we need to protect . . . I think when we talk about boxing reform we got to 
worry about the small guy. 
Id. 
 157. Moore, supra note 16, at 238 (“[T]he boxers that the Ali Act does reach are not the ones in 
need of the most protection.  Instead, the Ali Act protects the boxers that have already reached a level of 
success within the profession.”). 
 158. Symposium, supra note 17, at 223 (statement of Jim Thomas) (“[I]n my opinion you can give 
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contain any provisions requiring its dissemination to boxers.  In contrast, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act requires covered employers to prominently 
display a poster “informing employees of their rights and responsibilities under the 
Act.”159  The Ali Act contains no such display requirement, yet it would be simple 
and informative to require that all boxing gyms post relevant provisions of the Act 
in locker rooms or gym walls.  Alternatively, the brief Ali Act—the entire bill 
totals eight pages—should be a mandatory attachment to all contracts, especially 
those signed by unrepresented boxers.160  Requiring the boxer to read and sign the 
Ali Act before signing any contract with a manager, promoter or sanctioning body 
would at least alert him that there is some protective federal legislation he may 
invoke.  If nothing else, the boxer’s bargaining position might be marginally 
enhanced.  To the extent that requiring the Ali Act either be posted in gyms or 
attached to contracts increases transaction costs, those costs should be borne by the 
promoters and sanctioning bodies who not only can best afford to pay them, but 
also whose unethical behavior necessitated the extra disclosure. 
Some commentators have also suggested requiring that state boxing 
“commissions . . . not recognize contracts that are signed [by boxers] without 
independent legal advice.”161 Independent counsel would alert a boxer to the Ali 
Act’s relevant provisions, thereby preventing their exposure to illegal or coercive 
contract terms.  Of course, “the problem is how [to] make that . . . affordable to 
fighters at the lower level who don’t have enough money.”162  Jim Thomas 
suggested “challeng[ing] the Bar Associations in connection with law school[s] to 
make [legal] advice available” to boxers.163  In other words, call on state Bar 
Associations to direct attorneys to donate some of their pro bono hours to helping 
boxers negotiate and sign contracts, while simultaneously prevailing upon law 
schools to establish clinics dedicated to the same end.  Despite the abuses boxers 
suffer at the hands of promoters, sanctioning bodies and managers, there are some 
with far greater need of legal aid.  Yet, it is likely that the opportunity to represent 
professional athletes will inspire more people to devote greater time to pro bono 
work.  Thus, providing free representation for boxers will not drain the pool of 
available pro bono hours for other potential recipients, but rather add volume to 
that pool so that more people may benefit. 
Whether its provisions are prominently displayed in gyms and locker rooms, 
affixed to contracts or explained by a pro bono lawyer, the Ali Act must be exposed 
and elucidated in order to be effective.  Otherwise, its anonymity, its lack of 
enforcement and its parsimonious protection of “blue collar” boxers reduce it to a 
 
all the rights in the world to fighters by rules but if there is nobody there to enforce those rights for the 
fighters, they might as well not have the rights.”). 
 159. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2006); General OSHA Recordkeeping 
and Posting, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH NETWORK (Oct. 29, 2000), 
http://www.osh.net/articles/archive/osh_basics_2000_oct20.htm. 
 160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301–13. 
 161. Symposium, supra note 17, at 223 (statement of Jim Thomas). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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well intentioned but largely ineffectual piece of legislation. 
III.  PROPOSED CHANGES 
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion in Parts I and II that the Ali Act 
cannot and does not do enough to purge boxing of coercive contracts, rankings 
manipulation or piecemeal and ineffective state regulation.  The fact remains that 
the “business of boxing is driven by the interconnectedness of promoters, 
managers, and sanctioning organizations.”164  Trying to overlay this corrupt 
industry with federal regulations is like dropping roses into a broken vase.  A less 
elegant, but perhaps more appropriate simile compares the Ali Act to “putting a 
band-aid on a gaping wound that’s badly in need of sutures.”165  Part III of this 
Article will now offer three proposals—effective jointly or individually—that are 
intended to provide boxing with needed and fundamental changes.  These proposals 
are:  1) passage of the Professional Boxing Amendments Act; 2) private regulation 
of the boxing industry; and 3) the creation of a union for boxers. 
A.  THE PROFESSIONAL BOXING AMENDMENTS ACT 
Senator John McCain, who sponsored both the Professional Boxers Safety Act 
and the Ali Act, has introduced legislation every year since 2002 entitled the 
Professional Boxing Amendments Act (“PBAA”).166  The central purpose of this 
“truly revolutionary” bill is to create the United States Boxing Administration 
(“USBA”), a federal regulatory agency to oversee the sport.167  According to 
Senator McCain: 
The primary functions of the USBA would be to protect the health, safety, and general 
interest of boxers . . . [T]he USBA would, among other things: administer Federal 
boxing laws and coordinate with other Federal regulatory agencies to ensure that these 
laws are enforced; oversee all professional boxing matches in the United States; and 
work with the boxing industry and local commissions to improve the statuts [sic] and 
standards of the sport.168 
The PBAA, through the creation of the USBA, directly addresses and mitigates 
many of the shortcomings and oversights of the Ali Act.  First, § 202(b) of the 
PBAA would require that the three appointed members of the USBA have 
“extensive experience in professional boxing activities.”169  In addition, the 
members of the USBA “would be precluded from any dealings in the boxing 
industry, and not more than two members would be from the same political 
 
 164. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1187. 
 165. THOMAS HAUSER, A YEAR AT THE FIGHTS 209 (2003). 
 166. McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 30; see Professional Boxing Amendments Act, S. 84, 
110th Cong. (2007). 
 167. Burstein, supra note 9, at 466. 
 168. 148 CONG. REC. S5032-02 (daily ed. June 5, 2002) (statement of Sen. John McCain). 
 169. S. 84 § 202(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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party.”170  These requirements would prevent the USBA from being stricken with 
the same afflictions that compromise and enervate state boxing commissions; 
namely, that they are run by political appointees with no knowledge of boxing who 
are ultimately beholden to the promoters and sanctioning bodies who support their 
political benefactors.  There would thus be hope that USBA members would show 
more solicitude for boxers than their counterparts on state boxing commissions 
have historically conceded. 
Sections 204 and 207 of the PBAA, in tandem, provide the effective 
enforcement mechanism that the Ali Act so fatally lacks.171  Section 204 requires 
that “boxers, managers, promoters, and sanctioning organizations be licensed by 
the [United States Boxing Commission (“USBC”)] to participate in a professional 
boxing match.”172  Meanwhile, § 207 requires: 
authoriz[ing] the USBC, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, to suspend or 
revoke any license issued under [the bill] if the USBC finds that . . . there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that a USBC standard is not being met or that certain 
criminal acts have occurred . . . or the licensee has violated a provision of the 
PBSA.173 
Further, § 207 “authorize[s] the USBC to conduct investigations and seek 
injunctions to further the purposes of the PBSA,” as well as “to intervene . . . on 
behalf of the public interest in any civil action relating to professional boxing filed 
in a United States district court.”174  As a result, under the PBAA, an injured boxer 
would not have to go through the lengthy and costly process of litigation in order to 
void an illegal contract.  Rather, the PBAA would grant him recourse to an 
administrative hearing in which he could rely on the USBC to conduct discovery 
and prosecute his claim. 
Further, by authorizing the USBC to suspend or revoke licenses necessary for 
managers, promoters and sanctioning organizations to participate in boxing 
matches, the PBAA confronts transgressors with a clear and effective penalty.  
Because U.S. Attorneys have uniformly decided not to seek misdemeanor 
convictions under the Ali Act, managers, promoters and sanctioning organizations 
have not had an incentive to change their illegal business models.  However, the 
more immediately effectuated threat of license revocation should have a chilling 
effect on their coercive, corrupt or unethical practices. 
In addition, the PBAA mandates that “[n]o person may arrange, promote, 
organize, produce, or fight in a professional boxing match within the United States 
unless the match” is both “approved by the [USBC]” and “held in a State . . . that 
regulates professional boxing matches in accordance with standards and criteria 
established by the [USBC].”175  At first blush, this provision would seem to bring 
 
 170. S. REP. NO. 110-28, at 4 (2007). 
 171. S. REP. NO. 110-28, at 14, 15. 
 172. Id. at 14. 
 173. Id. at 15. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Professional Boxing Amendments Act, S. 84, 110th Cong. § 5(a) (2007). 
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any U.S. boxing match within the USBC’s purview, whether it was a heavyweight 
title bout, or a fight between two boxers earning “as little as $200–$400” for the 
night.176  After all, the provision mandates the authorization of any “professional 
boxing match within the United States.”  “Professional boxing match” is defined by 
the Act as “a boxing contest held in the United States between individuals for 
financial compensation.”177  The definition contemplates neither a floor nor a 
ceiling for the amount of compensation that must be involved in order for the 
“boxing contest” to be considered a “professional boxing match.”  Thus, the PBAA 
apparently provides a similar level of protection for both contenders and club 
fighters by requiring matches involving both groups to be approved by the USBC. 
However, subsequent provisions seem to militate the effectiveness of this 
protection, especially for “blue collar” boxers.  For example, § 204(b)(1) states that, 
apart from limited exceptions, the USBC “shall be presumed to have approved any 
match.”178  Of the four enumerated exceptions, one exempts matches “with respect 
to which the [USBC] has been informed of an alleged violation of [the PBAA].”179  
Another exempts matches in which one of the boxers has either “suffered 10 
consecutive defeats in professional boxing matches; or has been knocked out 5 
consecutive times in professional boxing matches.”180  These exceptions to 
presumed USBC approval actually serve to protect the lowest of blue collar boxers, 
as only they will have “suffered 10 consecutive defeats” or “been knocked out 5 
consecutive times.” 
On the other hand, the two remaining exceptions apply exclusively to boxing’s 
upper class.  For example, USBC approval of a match is not presumed if it is 
“advertised to the public as a championship match,” or if it is “scheduled for 10 
rounds or more.”181  As discussed, only top contenders participate in matches 
lasting ten rounds or more, and only the best of those contenders have the 
opportunity to fight in a championship match.  Thus, the PBAA mandates actual 
USBC approval only of bouts featuring the very least, and the very most, successful 
boxers.182  Unfortunately, the majority of boxers fall within these two poles, and 
will thus be left unprotected by the PBAA’s sanctioning requirement—which, 
despite its seeming promise, is little more than a Potemkin Village.183 
 
 176. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1192. 
 177. S. 84 § 3(a). 
 178. Id. § 5(a). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Admittedly, there would be a substantial cost to requiring the USBC to explicitly sanction 
every professional boxing match that occurs in the United States.  Thus, it makes sense to delegate 
approval to on-the-ground state boxing commissions and to require explicit USBC approval only under 
certain enumerated circumstances.  On the other hand, it seems nonsensical to establish a federal boxing 
commission, to require that it sanctions every professional boxing match taking place in the United 
States and then to add a provision that allows its sanction to be approved in the mine run of matches. 
 183. The approval presumption must be read in conjunction with Section 208, which permits state 
boxing commissions to sanction professional boxing matches “to the extent not inconsistent with the 
provisions of the [PBAA].”  S. 84, § 208(a).  In other words, the presumption merely means that explicit 
USBC approval is not needed—outside of the four enumerated exceptions—because state boxing 
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Perhaps most importantly, the PBAA, while still sympathetic to federalism 
concerns, sets a standard for boxing legislation that must act as a floor for any 
particularized state lawmaking in the field.  While noting that “nothing in [the 
PBAA] prohibits any boxing commission from exercising any of its powers . . . 
with respect to the regulation . . . of professional boxing . . . to the extent not 
inconsistent with the provisions of” the proposed federal law, the PBAA establishes 
that any state boxing legislation must “exceed the minimum standards or 
requirements . . . under [the] Act.”184  Again, the PBAA remedies one of the main 
shortcomings of the Ali Act:  its failure to create a uniform federal law of boxing. 
The PBAA also “strengthen[s] existing federal boxing laws” by eliding 
provisions merely offering “the sense of Congress” from the Ali Act, and replacing 
them with mandatory language.185  For example, § 109 requires the USBC, in 
consultation with the ABC, to “develop guidelines for minimum contractual 
provisions that shall be included in each bout agreement, boxer-manager contract, 
and promotional agreement.”186  Moreover, the PBAA mandates that “[e]ach 
boxing commission shall ensure that these minimal contractual provisions are 
present in any such agreement or contract submitted to it.”187  Thus, not only does 
the PBAA require that the contract provisions developed by the USBA be included 
in every contract signed by a boxer, it mandates that the state boxing commission 
actually review these contracts to ensure they comply with the law.  The Ali Act, as 
discussed, required neither action. 
Again, it must be noted that requiring the establishment of uniform, mandatory 
contractual provisions limits a boxer’s freedom to contract as much as a 
promoter’s.  An unheralded boxer might have to accept contract terms falling 
below the federally mandated floor in order to even get his “shot” in the ring.  
Otherwise, a promoter might decide that signing an unproven prospect is too 
expensive or too risky.188  Thus, fringe boxers might actually be harmed by 
provisions meant to protect them. 
Arguably, boxers should have the right to subject themselves to arrangements 
that do not include the PBAA’s mandatory contractual provisions in the hopes of 
proving their worth during the course of their initial contract and thereby securing 
more favorable terms during their next negotiations.  While it seems unfair to label 
the PBAA’s restriction of boxers’ right to contract—as IBF General Counsel 
Walter R. Stone did—as “benign racism,” it is fair to view the restriction as 
 
commissions’ approval is presumed to be a stand in for Commission approval.  However, the 
presumption remains troubling.  If the PBAA is necessary because state boxing commissions are unable 
or unwilling to enforce regulations that adequately protect boxers, allowing a wide presumption that 
they are doing so—and therefore not subject to direct USBC oversight in sanctioning bouts—seems 
unwise. 
 184. S. 84 § 208. 
 185. McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 30. 
 186. S. 84 § 10(a). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 79, at 192 (statement of Murad Muhammad) 
(“Everybody thinks a promoter makes money in the first, second, third fight.  Sometimes we lose in ten 
just to make it on the 12th.”). 
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“paternalistic.”189  Ultimately, the conflicting needs to protect boxers from unfair 
contracts and to allow them the freedom to enter into contracts that make them 
attractive to promoters, may be resolved by providing an informed consent opt-out 
provision.  The provision would allow a boxer to waive his right to certain contract 
provisions upon a showing to the USBC or relevant state boxing commission that 
he is doing so knowingly and freely. 
The PBAA also addresses rankings manipulation, requiring the USBC to 
“develop guidelines for objective and consistent written criteria for the rating of 
professional boxers based on the athletic merits and professional record of the 
boxers.”190  Again, the PBAA gives one of its provisions actual bite by further 
mandating that “[w]ithin 90 days after the [USBC’s] promulgation of the 
guidelines, each sanctioning organization . . . adopt the guidelines and follow 
them.”191  Though the criteria used to determine rankings are still vague—i.e., 
“athletic merits and professional record”—and the power to actually promulgate the 
rankings remains with the sanctioning bodies and not a panel of sportswriters, 
historians, broadcasters and former boxers, the mandatory adoption of rankings 
criteria is a strong step towards eliminating rankings manipulation. 
At first blush, supervising rankings might seem to be an unwise use of the 
USBC’s limited resources.  After all, by definition, rankings only affect an 
infinitesimally small percentage of boxing’s 8,500 athletes.192  However, rankings 
manipulation “tarnishes” the sport, its champions and its marquee bouts.193  The 
fact that boxing’s rankings have “less credibility and confidence among the boxers 
and the fans than any other sports rating system in the world” surely diminishes the 
sport’s marketability and popularity.194  As a result, while only a relative handful of 
boxers will be directly affected by the PBAA’s attempt to ameliorate rankings 
fraud, all boxers would conceivably benefit by the trickle down effects of 
increasing the sport’s credibility and attractiveness to fans turned away by decades 
of scandal and corruption. 
Despite all its salutary provisions, the PBAA is not without fault.  Most 
fundamentally, the prospects of the bill being enacted seem slight.  As stated, 
Senator McCain has been unable to shepherd the bill into law, despite efforts to do 
so dating back to 2002.  Relatedly, “[t]here is very strong opposition [to a federal 
commission] on the part of the states.”195  Also, “[m]any question whether the . . . 
 
 189. Ali Act Hearings, supra note 32, at 33 (statement of Walter R. Stone, General Counsel, IBF) 
(calling Congress’s regulation of boxing “benign racism at worst  . . . and at best paternalist and over 
reaching.”). 
 190. S. 84 § 12(a). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Assuming the same ten to fifteen boxers in their respective weight classes by the different 
sanctioning organizations, only 240 of boxing’s 8,500 athletes would be ranked.  Thus, less than .05% of 
all boxers are likely to be ranked at any given time. 
 193. See Jurek, supra note 7, at 1187 (“Years of corruption, manipulation, and scandal have 
tarnished the sport to the point that it is hardly covered by the mainstream media.”). 
 194. See Symposium, supra note 17, at 210 (statement of Paul Feeney). 
 195. Brown, supra note 34, at 16 (quoting an anonymous official of the New York State Boxing 
and Wrestling Commission). 
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Act promotes government waste,” especially given the Congressional Budget 
Office’s report that the USBC “would require $34 million in funding over a five-
year period.”196  However, the cost of running the USBC could likely be mitigated 
through the imposition of licensing fees and fines on managers, promoters and 
sanctioning bodies.  Finally, there is considerable doubt, given the fact that the 
“powers-that-be” in boxing are “comfortable with the status quo,” that Congress 
will ever be able to affect the industry beyond “cleaning up certain problematic 
aspects of the sport.”197  While the business of boxing may, in fact, be “structured 
in a way that prevents Congress from reaching all of the sport’s ailments” because 
there are “too many aspects of boxing well beyond congressional reach that need to 
be addressed in order for it to be the sport’s savior,” finally passing the PBAA 
would at least give boxers a fighting chance in a system designed to manipulate, 
abuse and coerce them.198 
B.  UNIONIZATION 
While some commentators claim that “if a boxers’ union were established, it 
would be enormously beneficial to its members” by serving to “ensure that boxers 
are treated fairly and [by] shift[ing] the balance of power from the promoters and 
sanctioning bodies to the boxers themselves,” it is unclear how much benefit a 
union would actually provide.199  It should be noted that boxing is one of the few 
professional sports without a union.200  While unions have proved undeniably 
effective in other sports, especially baseball, a union might not provide similar 
advantages to boxers.201 
First, boxers have historically been unable to establish a union.202  Much of the 
difficulty may lie in the caste system that persists in the sport.203  The blue collar 
boxers most in need of establishing a union have the least ability and leverage to do 
so.  Given the sheer number of professional boxers in the United States, it is not 
only exceedingly difficult to launch any collective action, but also promoters likely 
will always be able to pluck a desperate boxer willing to fight for some much 
needed cash.204  Also, because the career span of boxers is so brief, and because so 
 
 196. Moore, supra note 16, at 226. 
 197. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1226; Patrick Kehoe, Lou DiBella on Boxing Reform, 
SECONDSOUT.COM, http://www.secondsout.com/archive/patrick-kehoe/lou-dibella-on-boxing-reform1 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011) (statement of Lou DiBella) . 
 198. Jurek, supra note 7, at 1226. 
 199. Burstein, supra note 9, at 494. 
 200. Baglio, supra note 20, at 2267 (“The structure of the boxing industry is also different from 
that of other sports in that other athletes are represented through a players’ association or union, while 
there is no such group for boxers.”). 
 201. See History of the Major League Baseball Players Association, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
PLAYERS ASS’N, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/history.jsp (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). 
 202. See Kathy Glasgow, The Fight of Their Lives, MIAMI NEW TIMES, July 20, 2000, 
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2000-07-20/news/the-fight-of-their-lives/. 
 203. See McCain & Nahigian, supra note 32, at 8 (contrasting the “premier side” of boxing with 
the “vast majority of professional boxing events . . . featur[ing] unknown journeymen”). 
 204. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
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many journeymen fighters support themselves with other nine-to-five jobs, there is 
little time or effort to devote to unionizing.  The upper-class boxers, on the other 
hand, have no need for a union.  The top boxers are fabulously wealthy, and have 
no need to draw on their leverage in order to help establish a union.205  Moreover, 
even the ruling class of boxers fear being blacklisted, and are therefore unlikely to 
lend their cache to a cause that would no longer help them.206 
The establishment of a boxers’ union may, in fact, be contrary to the interests of 
the sport’s top earners.  “It is a first principle of the National Labor Relations Act 
that employees in a bargaining unit lose their ‘right’ to bargain individually when a 
majority vote to be represented by a union.”207  As the Second Circuit once wrote: 
[I]n sports leagues, unionized players generally engage in individual bargaining with 
teams . . . ‘once an exclusive representative has been selected, the individual 
employee is forbidden by federal law from negotiating directly with the employer 
absent the representative’s consent, even though that employee may actually receive 
less compensation under the collective bargain than he or she would through 
individual negotiations.208 
Therefore, top professional boxers may find their earning potential limited by a 
ceiling on purses established during collective bargaining.  While an earnings cap 
would likely be offered in exchange for benefits accruing to boxing’s vast 
underclass, it is unlikely that the sport’s elite would assent to, much less actively 
pursue, the establishment of a union in which their interests would be decidedly 
idiosyncratic.  Currently, superstar boxers “often have special individual talents” 
that allow them to exponentially out-earn blue collar boxers under the current 
system.209  The establishment of a union would permit boxers “to seek the best deal 
for the greatest number by the exercise of collective rather than individual 
bargaining power.”210  Thus, the very boxers whose star power would be most 
essential to the founding of a boxers’ union are also those who would be most 
likely to oppose it as contrary to their interests. 
More fundamentally, it is unclear whether boxers would be able to legally 
establish a union.  Under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 
“[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing.”211  The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) is empowered to 
certify that a union is “appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining.”212  
 
 205. See Symposium, supra note 17, at 249 (statement of Evander Holyfield) (“[W]hen I was the 
undisputed champion of the world I was going to get more than 17 million dollars.”). 
 206. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 207. Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by 
Athletes:  Of Super Stars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1971). 
 208. Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, 66 F.3d 523, 528 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)) (emphasis added). 
 209. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 518 U.S. 231, 249 (1996). 
 210. Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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However, it is unclear whether boxers may unionize and bargain collectively under 
the NLRA because the Act excludes “independent contractors” from its definition 
of “employees.” 213  Only workers falling under the Act’s definition of employee 
may unionize and bargain collectively with their respective employers. 
While the NLRB and courts apply a common law agency test to determine 
whether a worker should be classified as an employee or an independent contractor, 
there is “no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the 
answer, but all the incidents of the [employment] relationship must be assessed and 
weighed with no one factor being decisive.”214  In FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 
the court determined that the petitioner package delivery provider’s single-route 
drivers were independent contractors, rather than employees, under the NLRA.215  
The court’s conclusion was premised on the fact that FedEx could not “prescribe 
hours of work, whether or when the contractors take breaks, what routes they 
follow, or other details of performance.”216  Moreover, the single-route drivers 
were “not subject to reprimands or other discipline” and did “not need to show up 
at work every day.”217 
Even assuming that boxers and promoters enter into an employment contract, 
rather than merely a promotional contract, it is unlikely that a court would find 
boxers to be employees under the NLRA.  Like the single-route drivers found to be 
independent contractors in FedEx Home Delivery, boxers structure their training 
without direction from their promoters, are not “subject to reprimands or other 
discipline” from promoters and are not required to show up at work—i.e., the 
gym—every day. 
Illustratively, professional golfers—the athletes whose situation most resembles 
that of boxers because they compete in a tour rather than a private league—were 
found to be independent contractors by the Supreme Court.218  The differences 
between the PGA Tour and the current structure of professional boxing will be 
discussed in greater detail in Section C of this Part.  For now, it suffices to note that 
while golfers arguably have a stronger argument that they are employees of the 
Tour than boxers’ argument that they are employees of their respective promoters, 
 
 213. Id. § 152(3). 
 214. NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968).  The D.C. Circuit has provided the 
following guidance: 
The common law factors include, inter alia, ‘the extent of control which, by the agreement, the 
master may exercise over the details of the work’; ‘the kind of occupation’; whether the worker 
‘supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work’; ‘the method of payment, whether 
by the time or by the job’; ‘the length of time for which the person is employed’; whether ‘the 
work is a part of the regular business of the employer’; and the intent of the parties. 
FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY  § 220(2) (1958). 
 215. FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 504. 
 216. Id. at 498. 
 217. Id. at 498–99. 
 218. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 678 (2001) (adopting the district court’s finding 
that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply to a golfer because he was an 
independent contractor rather than an employee). 
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the former are—according to the Supreme Court—independent contractors.219 
On the other hand, if established, a boxers’ union would provide “oversight of 
all the various actions of promoters and sanctioning bodies.”220  Such a union could 
“demand fair treatment of its members and could put pressure on promoters and 
sanctioning organizations through the use of boxer strikes,” however difficult it 
may be to maintain a strike involving 8,500 athletes.221  More practically, “a union 
could set up health and retirement plans for its members,” which are currently 
absent and undoubtedly vital in boxing.222 
Moreover, if boxers unionized, they would have recourse to the NLRB’s 
streamlined adjudicatory procedures, which are less costly and time consuming 
than litigating in court.  The NLRB, in turn, is empowered to petition U.S. courts of 
appeals to enforce orders granting either “appropriate temporary relief” or a 
“restraining order” precluding the “unfair labor practice.”223  Here, too, boxers 
would be spared the time and expense of proceeding on their own in court.  Finally, 
a boxers’ union could educate its members as to their rights under various state and 
federal laws, provide for a legal defense fund and disseminate information about 
the unethical practices of certain managers, promoters or sanctioning bodies. 
Boxers’ lack of labor law remedies, especially recourse to the NLRB’s 
adjudicatory procedures, coupled with the prohibitive time and expense of 
litigation, agitate for the implementation of the PBAA’s own adjudicatory 
provisions.  Like the NLRB, the USBC is empowered by the PBAA to conduct 
investigations, issue subpoenas and bring an action in federal courts for injunctive 
relief.224  In addition, as noted, the USBC may, “after notice and opportunity for a 
hearing, suspend or revoke any license . . . if the Commission finds that the license 
holder has violated any provision of” the PBAA or if “the suspension or revocation 
is necessary for the protection of health and safety or is otherwise in the public 
interest.”225  Under the PBAA, boxers would feel less acutely the absence of labor 
law remedies guaranteed by the NLRA. 
C.  PRIVATE REGULATION 
A final solution for “eliminat[ing] the exploitation,” corruption and 
manipulation that have “tarnished” boxing is to change the “entire structure” of the 
sport through the creation of a “private league . . . that is responsible for all aspects 
of the sport.” 226  Boxing is the “only national sport without a national 
commissioner to enforce safety standards, rules and integrity.”227  Ideally, a private, 
independent organization could “oversee all of the transactions that occur within 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. Burstein, supra note 9, at 494. 
 221. Id. 
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 223. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2006). 
 224. Professional Boxing Amendments Act, S. 84, 110th Cong. § 207(b) (2007). 
 225. Id. § 207(a)(1). 
 226. Baglio, supra note 20, at 2296; Burstein, supra note 9, at 494; Jurek, supra note 7, at 1187. 
 227. Jack Newfield, Should We Let Boxing Die?, PARADE, May 2, 2004, at 7. 
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the boxing industry, similar to how leagues operate in team sports.  All contracts 
[could] be registered and reviewed by this organization, which [could] also make 
certain that all parties perform their obligations under these agreements.”228  In fact, 
if all members of the boxing community agree to be bound by the organization’s 
rules, it could then “create a code of uniform practices and procedure . . . [and] 
enforce its own rules through the use of fines or expulsion from the sport.”229  
Moreover, the “organization [could] also rank boxers in each weight division,” 
providing what would ideally be a fair and impartial rating system.230 
Privatization in boxing may be modeled after the Professional Golfers’ 
Association (“PGA”), as suggested by Devin Burstein.  The PGA is a nonprofit 
organization comprised of over 23,000 professional golfers.231  It “sponsors 
multiple golf tours, where professional golfers go to various golf venues and 
compete against one another.  All of the golfers playing against each other at a 
professional PGA event are members of the PGA.”232  The PGA is empowered to 
“set uniform rules for the sport.”233  PGA golfers must abide by the expounded 
rules or else face fines or be excluded from events.234  The PGA Commissioner 
may discipline offending tour participants.235  In sum, the “PGA example provides 
important concepts upon which a professional boxers’ association could be 
built.”236 
It is easy to see how the tour model could be applied to boxing.  A 
corresponding “entity” would “sponsor . . . professional [boxing] tournaments . . . 
[in arenas] leased and operated” by the Tour. 237  As in golf, each event could take 
place over three to four days.  As individual boxers, unlike golfers, only fight a few 
times per year, the number and length of events would permit most of boxing’s 
8,500 athletes to participate in Tour-sanctioned matches.  By holding a number of 
events in venues not accustomed to hosting professional boxing matches, the Tour 
could help sow the seeds of the sport’s future popularity. 
In 2007, the PGA Tour earned nearly a billion dollars in revenue.238  Much of 
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 231. Burstein, supra note 9, at 495 n.393 (citation omitted).  For an overview of the development 
of the professional golf tours, see AL BARKOW, THE HISTORY OF THE PGA TOUR (1989). 
 232. Burstein, supra note 9, at 495. 
 233. Id.; see also Deesen v. Prof’l Golfer’s Ass’n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966); Weser v. Prof’l 
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the PGA Tour’s revenue “is distributed in prize money.”239  Similarly, the revenues 
generated by a professional boxing tour through “television, admissions, 
concessions, and contributions from cosponsors” would constitute participating 
boxers’ purse money.240 
Moreover, the Tour could establish “rules [that] govern competition in tour 
events.”241  The Tour’s promulgation of uniform rules would obviate the perils of 
patchwork state regulation discussed throughout this Article, without raising the 
specter of an intrusive and overreaching federal regulatory scheme.  As noted, case 
law establishes the ability of the would-be Tour Commissioner to enforce rules and 
regulations through the imposition of fines and suspensions. 
However, because the PGA “sponsors all of the events for the players,” 
imposing its structure on boxing would “leave[] no room for promoters,” and “it is 
improbable that promoters could be completely eliminated from a sport in which 
they are such an integral part.”242  One commentator has suggested that the federal 
government act to cut promoters out of boxing by “mak[ing] a law that in order to 
participate in professional boxing, the participant must be a member of the private 
association” modeled on the PGA.243  Yet, the federal government has thus far not 
exhibited any willingness to encroach so substantially on boxing’s current 
structure. 
Once established, the boxing “tour” could provide matches with a measure of 
credibility and luster lacking from promotions occurring outside of its purview, 
thus attracting greater fan appreciation and participation.  However, in order to gain 
that status, the tour would first have to either incorporate or usurp boxing’s 
powerful promoters.  The former option would probably be more successful.  Tour 
organizers could point to boxing’s ever-decreasing visibility and profitability under 
the current regime.244  Promoters may be amenable to becoming shareholders in a 
tour whose imprimatur promises to allow them to share admittedly smaller pieces 
of a larger pie.245  It is conceivable that the business model provided by a private 
tour that stamped out corruption and manipulation would lead to higher television 
ratings, increased opportunities for merchandizing and larger venues for 
professional boxing matches.  By seeking to incorporate, rather than oust the 
promoters, tour organizers may be able to secure boxers’ participation in the private 
tour without recourse to federal regulation requiring that participation.  Of course, 
once the promoters have been incorporated into the tour’s profit-making hierarchy, 
the problem would become ensuring that the tour’s rules and bylaws protect boxers 
rather than merely empower promoters to continue their unethical and predatory 
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practices by different means. 
Many of the same obstacles that apply to establishing a boxers’ union present an 
even greater barrier to creating a private, national organization to govern the sport, 
regardless of whether that organization takes the form of a league or a tour.  First, 
“for a private league [or tour] to work, all aspects of professional boxing would 
have to be governed by the league.  Without this absolute power, promoters could 
choose to ignore the league and operate outside of its regulations and its watch.”246  
In other words, if a portion of the country’s 8,500 professional boxers decided that 
their interests would be better served by not joining the proposed private 
organization, such an organization would be powerless both to provide protection 
or oversight to those fighters, and to bring promoters and sanctioning bodies within 
its jurisdiction.  More fatally, the promoters, the managers, the sanctioning 
organizations and the state boxing commissions all profit too much under the status 
quo to permit such a disastrous and ruinous disruption to their business models.  
Harry Reid listed Don King and Bob Arum as his two most important constituents, 
not Floyd Mayweather and Mike Tyson, who are also Nevada residents.247  It is 
telling that Senator McCain has been unable to pass the PBAA, despite his ardent 
efforts over the better part of this past decade. 
While some iteration of the PBAA has been passed by the Senate four times, it 
has never been voted on by the House of Representatives.248  In other words, it has 
not so much been killed as it has been left to die.  Similarly, in 1999, the Ali Act 
“was never brought to a final vote . . . due to the use of ‘arcane Senate rules’ 
employed by two Democratic Senators to block the vote.”249  Several Senators later 
identified Nevada Senator Harry Reid “as being responsible for blocking the 
vote.”250  Certainly, the PBAA has powerful opponents, not only in affluent 
promoters whose nefarious business practices would be constrained by its 
provisions, but also in politically connected state athletic commissions who 
“object[] to a federal [boxing] commission because they feel it may supercede and 
negatively impact” their own authority.251 
Undoubtedly, a private governing boxing organization would be far more 
disruptive to those who control boxing than the PBAA could ever hope to be.  The 
money, the power and the inertia all lie on the side of those whose interests would 
be harmed, if not destroyed, by the creation of a private boxing organization.  For 
that reason, though such an organization would be the change most likely to 
provide real, lasting protection for boxers, it is also the change that is least likely to 
occur, unless promoters could be convinced that their financial interests would be 
best served by joining the organization. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Boxing is perhaps the oldest sport in existence, owing to its primal simplicity 
and balletic brutality.  It has been depicted in 5,000 year old Sumerian stone 
carvings and iconic photographs, and contested everywhere from the first Olympic 
Games to backyards and playgrounds across the world.252  Yet, the sport that was 
once “second in popularity only to baseball” in the United States is now, after 
decades of “corruption, manipulation, and scandal . . . hardly covered by the 
mainstream media.”253  Twice, Congress has passed bills aimed at protecting 
vulnerable boxers, both within the ring and without.  Nevertheless, boxers are still 
being killed in the ring at an alarming rate, subjected to illegal, coercive contracts 
and failed by the laws enacted to protect them.254 
While the Professional Boxing Amendments Act offers the promise of 
substantive and enforceable protections for boxers, Congress has knocked it down 
more times than Jack Dempsey floored Jess Willard.255  The prospect of 
unionization and the creation of a private governing boxing organization is too 
remote and impractical to offer substantial hope to boxers.  Perhaps, then, the 
sport’s best chance lies with fighters like Oscar de la Hoya and Shane Mosley, 
champions who have used their wealth and affluence to become top promoters 
themselves. They—not Congress, not the hordes of journeymen boxers and not the 
ABC—are in the best position to leverage their power in order to truly 
revolutionize the sport.  The question remains:  Will they answer the bell? 
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